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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to analyze theories developed both in favor and against privacy 
protection according to current practices in the West. In the paper, we will examine 
economic justifications for privacy protection as defined by American economists 
and jurists, as well as the advantages to be derived by a possible elimination of said 
protection. Moving beyond existing economic theories, this piece develops a new 
economic idea, wherein privacy protection is warranted when an individual becomes 
interested in another's habits for a specific reason: to root out different behaviors  in 
that person by observing a behavior that is correlated with those behaviors.   
Imagine the scenario of a worker who is also a soccer player, who is not competitive 
on the job, and is a team player, when he plays soccer, with his co-workers. The two 
facts, one of loving his own soccer team, and second, of not being competitive in the 
workplace are expressions of the same human attitude, or of a certain aspect of his 
personality. The employer is interested in finding out if this worker plays soccer in 
order to identify a lack of competitiveness on the job, and perhaps to assign him 
more menial tasks. The employer wishes to know the worker's interest in soccer in 
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order to deduce therefrom a second circumstance: non-competitiveness in the 
workplace.  
Thus if regulating others' conduct is not forbidden, the worker, in order not to be 
found out, will no longer play soccer; he will suffer a loss in terms of his personal 
welfare, while the employer, on the other hand, will gain nothing, having discovered 
nothing.  
From this comes a different justification for privacy protection. In the paper, 
however, we note that privacy protection is a tool for encouraging equality or, in 
pejorative terms, egalitarianism. Behind the privacy “screen,” indeed, everyone 
appears in shades of gray. Privacy protection makes individuals indistinguishable. In 
terms of inter-personal relationships, this means a “veil” of ignorance, with all its 
attendant costs.  Therefore, it is possible that the economic justifications defined by 
those in favor of privacy protection should be put aside in favor of transparency 
among individuals.  
 
1.  Introduction  
The verb “to discriminate,” at its simplest means “to distinguish,” although this has a 
negative connotation insofar as it includes the concept of “to exclude.”  
When making dinner plans, distinguishing a high-quality restaurant from a not-so-
good one involves discriminating against the worse in favor of the better. In the same 
way, distinguishing among different types of wine necessarily includes a sense of 
discriminating amongst them. Thus the customer who chooses the better restaurant 
discriminates against the worse; and the wine connoisseur who chooses the best 
wine discriminates against the others to the benefit of the former.  
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Each individual, in his or her daily life, makes discriminations. Tom can choose to 
spend the afternoon with Dick, discriminating against Harry; on the other hand, 
Harry might discriminate against Tom by deciding to buy from Dick.  Each individual 
who heads out to do his or her everyday shopping is carrying out a discrimination: in 
the first place because he or she chooses which commercial establishment to go to; 
in the second place because among the various merchandise on sale, he or she 
chooses the item he prefers, discriminating against the rest.1 
Discrimination is often based on elements existing in different goods, products and 
persons that make it possible for the person selecting among them to perceive a 
preference for certain characteristics. He or she who chooses wine of a higher 
alcohol proof prefers that type of beverage to a lower-proof wine.  Or a person who 
chooses a softer kind of pasta has an exact preference for the type of food that he or 
she intends to purchase. Where discrimination takes place based on confirmed 
information having to do with persons or goods, we can speak of “perfect 
discrimination.” 
A different type of discrimination, but just as common, is statistical discrimination.2  
In this case, the person must make a choice between two types of persons or 
products, calculate the average characteristics of the two categories, and choose the 
person or service belonging to the category with the better characteristics. Let us 
imagine that Tom, upon returning home, sees a young Chinese woman on one side 
of the street, and on the other side a man dressed in dark colors.  Given that he is, 
statistically speaking, more likely to be attacked by a man dressed in black as 
opposed to by a young Chinese woman, he might opt for the sidewalk where the 
                                                            
1 J. MacIntosh, Employment Discrimination: An Economic Perspective, 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 275, 277 
(1987),. 
2 E. Phelps., The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 Amer. Econ. Rev. 659 (1972). 
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young Chinese woman is walking.  To carry this reasoning a step further, one can say 
that Tom knows that in 5 % of the cases where a person passes a man dressed in 
black on the street, he or she is attacked, whereas this occurs only 1 % of the time 
when passing a young Chinese woman.  Thus, the economic calculation leads Tom to 
head toward the sidewalk on which the young woman is walking. In this way, he 
minimizes the anticipated damage and maximizes his well-being. Such a 
discrimination is modified by the adjective “statistic.” In order to explain this 
adjective, we go back to the man in black. The latter might be the most honest 
person one could ever meet, and the Chinese woman a dangerous killer, but the 
calculation of probability holds that a person is more likely to be attacked by a man 
in black than by a young Chinese woman.  
Statistical discrimination is not based on the person or the good's ascertained 
characteristics, but rather considers the average characteristics of the category to 
which these goods or persons belong. In this way it can be distinguished from 
perfect discrimination.  
Statistical discrimination is efficient on a private basis,3 in the sense that the subject 
using it maximizes his or her personal wellbeing. A different matter, and one to be 
looked into, is the theme of social desirability of statistical discrimination.  
Here we might note that many people make use of statistical discrimination. When, 
for example, we choose a restaurant because it appears cleaner and more attractive, 
we carry out a statistical discrimination. It is quite likely that a restaurant with a 
worse appearance might actually be better and cleaner; however, statistically 
speaking, it is likelier that the first restaurant is better than the second.  As a further 
example, imagine the person who is about to make a purchase: he or she lets 
himself or herself be enticed by a product packaging that appears to be well 
                                                            
3 E. Phelps, work cited, p.659. 
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thought-out, thus he or she chooses that product because he or she believes there 
to have been particular care in the product's preparation.  In that case, the person 
carries out a statistical discrimination, for it is quite possible that a product with a 
worse appearance actually be higher in quality, but what the purchaser knows is that 
it is more likely – although not 100 %  certain – that the selected product with the 
more polished packaging is higher in quality.  
That which might conflict with the sense of equity among individuals lies in the fact 
that a higher-quality good is discriminated against, or that an absolutely morally 
upright person is discriminated against in the moment the passerby crosses to the 
other sidewalk.  
Discrimination is based on different types of data.  First, “indices” and “signs” are 
taken into consideration.4 The “indices” are represented by those characteristics of 
the persons or things that cannot be modified (except at an almost prohibitively high 
costs) – such as the color of a person's skin, their race, age or sex. 
Signs, on the other hand, are those behaviors that involve a certain cost in order to 
be put into action, and which cannot be “mimed” by individuals with different 
characteristics. The most important signs are represented by upbringing, style of 
dress, driving style... 
To counter discrimination based on such indices, there is a complex legal discipline 
known as “anti discrimination.” A general characteristic of the indices is that there 
are easily visible to the observer's eye. However, “anti-discrimination” regulations 
are not limited to prohibiting discrimination based on the indices.  What 
                                                            
4 M. Spence, MARKET SIGNALING:INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED 
SCREENING PROCESS, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1974, p. 10: Spence thus defines 
the indices and signs: the former are observable characteristics which cannot be altered; the latter are 
observable and alterable characteristics.  
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characterizes this policy is the fact that, even if the individual should decide to 
display his or her characteristics (which are not indices and which would not 
otherwise be visible – such as his or her religious beliefs), he or she cannot, in 
certain contexts, be discriminated against.   
On the other hand, privacy policies exist to counter discrimination that involve 
elements that might be kept secret and which the subject wishes to keep secret.  
Thus, for example, a person might keep secret the results of certain medical exams, 
their G.P.A., their salary.  In terms of privacy policies, regulations do not have the 
goal to produce the effect that someone displaying his or her characteristics not be 
discriminated against, but rather enfranchise the individual with the right to keep 
certain information secret.  
With this, at any rate, we do not necessarily mean to state that the protection of 
personal privacy has the sole aim of eliminating discrimination, but rather we wish 
to indicate that this is one effect that it surely produces.  
Finally, we must consider discrimination based on signs.  Even if anti-discrimination 
policies handle this issue only tangentially, it may be the object of policies governing 
privacy.  
2.  Safeguarding Privacy and Equality 
The active subject, who intends to maximize his or her own wellbeing, tries to use all 
of the information he or she can source to carry out either a statistical or a perfect 
discrimination.  Privacy and anti-discrimination policies regulations prevent him or 
her from doing so.  What effects do such provisions produce? The legal provisions 
here considered immediately produce a certain effect: the individuals are treated 
more equally.  In the absence of discrimination based on medical-test results, the ill 
person will be treated in the same way as the healthy individual; without the 
possibility of discrimination based on national origin, the Spaniard will be treated 
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the same as the American. Such behaviors are inefficient on a private level if, as we 
have seen, the individual who acts on the basis of his own interests carries out 
statistical and perfect discriminations.  Anti-discrimination policies do not push the 
envelope too much: someone buying a can of tomatoes can certainly not be forced 
to choose at random in order to avoid a discrimination considered undesirable.  The 
same goes for the man walking down the street – he cannot be forbidden from 
choosing the sidewalk he prefers.   
One might say that behind the privacy “screen” all individuals are in a gray area.  In 
this sense, privacy policies lead down an American-style path towards egalitarianism.  
With privacy protection comes a wall behind which individuals' behaviors and data 
are hidden, making everyone more equal. Without the possibility of seeing two 
laborers' respective paychecks, one would tend not to consider this element in 
selecting one's best friend – one might even presume the two salaries to be 
equivalent. From this point of view, privacy regulations encourage egalitarianism.  To 
this is added the influence of anti-discrimination policies which impede 
discrimination based predominately on indices.  The result is a social situation in 
which equality among individuals is greatly increased, albeit at the cost of decreased 
efficiency.  The latter requires, after all, the greatest amount of information possible, 
so that the exchanges among the associated persons might have the greatest value.  
3. Economic Justification of Privacy Protection  
Discrimination, furthermore, has a negative connotation. Consider this case: 
employers wrongly believe women less capable of intellectual work than men; from 
this follows that men will be hired for higher-level positions, while women will be 
hired for entry-level positions. What effect will such conduct produce?  A first effect 
will be that women will not apply themselves particularly in acquiring intellectual 
capabilities – by studying, for example – because they know that they will be 
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discriminated against anyway.  Thus follows that women's supposed level of ability 
will actually be confirmed.  This will make for a (false) self-fulfilling prophecy.  If no 
woman applies herself to bettering her acuity because she knows that she will be 
discriminated against anyway, women's general intellectual level will remain low, and 
the employers' prophecy will be confirmed.5 
There are writers who are steadfastly opposed to privacy protection, even in the 
presence of the aforementioned considerations.  Richard Posner6 compared the 
subject who hides personal information to the salesperson who does not reveal his 
or her products' defects.7  The consequences of the salesperson who hides certain 
negative information might be generically identified in the loss of value in the 
exchange.  If a subject would value a certain product “10” where there was full 
disclosure, they might value “6” if there was potentially hidden information. There 
will therefore be a loss of value.  And this because the item might not work for the 
purchaser, it might command a lower price if resold, or it might need to be used 
more gingerly since it might be defective, and so on and so forth.  The same 
rationale must be applied to social interactions: if some information may be kept 
                                                            
5 K. Arrow, Some Models of Job Discrimination in A. H. Pascal, ed. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
ECONOMIC LIFE, Lexington Books, Lexington (Mass.), 1972 and "The Theory of Discrimination," in O. 
Aschenfelter and A. Rees eds, DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1973. 
6 R. Posner, entry: Privacy, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW,  
Peter Newman ed., London (1998), vol.III, pp. 103-108.  These unusual ideas on the protection of privacy 
were clearly  laid out by Posner in an article entitled “The Economics of Privacy,” 71 American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings 405 (May 1981).  Many ideas of Posner about privacy  were, furthermore, 
already present in the article entitled “The Right to Privacy,” published in 12 Georgia L. Rev. 393 (1978). 
7 A very good introduction of the economics of privacy is in K. Scheppele,  LEGAL SECRETS: 
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1988, pp. 24-42. 
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secret, the value of the relationship decreases.  This stems from not being able to 
trust the person completely, to confide in them openly, to have to be on one's guard 
around them, etc. Just as newspapers publish the defects of commercial products, so 
too, according to Posner, individuals must make their defects known.  
In his work,8 Posner cites the example of a lady who in her youth had worked as a 
prostitute, and who subsequently had been implicated in a murder.  Following those  
events, she had begun a normal life, had married, and had joined a local church – in 
short, she had become a respectable person.  It so happened that, later, a movie 
depicted the murder, and thus brought this woman's story back to the public eye.   
This lady sued for damages sustained from the invasion of her privacy and won. For 
Posner, the verdict was a mistake.9  Those who hide their personal facts attempt to 
create a falsely positive reputation by tricking others.  Moreover, a good reputation 
is capital that facilitates social and commercial exchanges; it cannot be effectively 
built up if there is a doubt that someone might be hiding something.  
In response to the objection that individuals revealing their own negative business 
might be ostracized, Posner points out that individuals – who tend to maximize their 
welfare – know how to assess the importance of a certain fact, or to evaluate 
whether the person has indeed changed over time.  If the person has, in fact, 
returned to a normal life, and if they have qualities that would enrich the other 
person's life, who would lose out in such a social exchange?  
All the same, it has been held that the freedom of gathering and transmitting 
information on others might have notably distorted effects.  Imagine being 
                                                            
8 R. Posner,entry: Privacy, cited, p. 106.  The more widely disseminated understanding of Posner's ideas on 
the right to privacy are expressed in THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 231-347, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.), 1981 
9   The case is  known as Melvin vs. Reid, 297 P 91 (Cal. 1931). 
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photographed while at home.  In order to hide what happens inside, individuals 
would have to resort to purchasing drapes or might even forgo windows entirely.  Or 
think of all those mini-behaviors that one might require to maintain different 
information secret, such as hiding one's paycheck, or keeping health information 
secret, etc.10 
One might say that such behaviors are perfectly futile, given that in these 
circumstances the “unraveling result” would be set off, that is, the principle of 
complete disclosure.11  According to this principle, individuals with better qualities 
would hide nothing, in order not to be confused with lower-quality individuals. Once 
the better are disclosed, those in the second category now find themselves in the 
new position of subjects with the better qualities. The latter, no longer able to be 
confused with those belonging to the initial “better” category, and now running the 
risk of being mistaken for the worse individuals, will declare themselves as well.  
Thus for the initial third category, and at the end of the process, all the individuals 
will  disclose information (except, maybe for those in the worst category, but it is a 
moot point, because from their not revealing themselves one would be able to 
deduce that they belong to the “worst” category since all of the other categories 
have already been disclosed and they can no longer be confused with these).  
That said, there is an objection to this sort of reasoning that the same Posner offers: 
information that an individual tends to hide are not only ones considered 
“discrediting,” but also “embarrassing” ones, even if devoid of any discrediting 
element. Imagine a man who does not want to be seen through a window while 
                                                            
10 R. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defence of Privacy, 84 Geo. L.J. 
2381  (1996). 
11  R. Gertner, entry: “Disclosure and Unravelling,” IN THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, cit., vol. I, pp. 605-608.  
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using the bathroom.  In this case, there is nothing discrediting – he cannot fool 
others regarding his age, physical condition, or  the natural, human function – and 
yet he is embarrassed to be seen through the window.  
The fact that information kept secret might be either discrediting or embarrassing  
prevents the mechanism of disclosure from entirely work: a certain category of 
persons might hide information that pertains to them not because these belong to a 
“worse” category, but rather because they would be embarrassed to reveal certain 
information.  There would then be a social cost borne by individuals to refrain from 
disclosing embarrassing information.   
We have already highlighted, in fact, that a possible justification for anti-
discrimination and privacy-protection regulations (we can, at this point in the study, 
consider them together) lies in keeping false prophecies from being fulfilled.  
We can therefore also identify new economically-based justifications for the 
protection of privacy.  It is critical to bear in mind that some behaviors form the 
subject of interest on the part of other associates because, in general, they are 
correlated to other behaviors or aspects of one's personality: think, for example, of 
the case of the faithful individual who attends his or her own church, and imagine 
that the followers of that religion have a scarce inclination for competitiveness.  A 
businessperson, interested in highly competitive workers, might want to know those 
persons who take part in religious services, in order to discriminate those belonging 
to a faith that is not associated with competitiveness.  It is the problem of 
correlation that I intend to underscore.  A behavior is correlated with a different 
behavior in which a third party is interested because of that same attitude that leads 
them to perform them.  He or she knows that the former behaviors would indicate 
obtaining the latter, in order to carry out a choice (a discrimination).  We must ask 
ourselves what would happen if the behaviors in which they are only indirectly 
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interested might be protected by the right to privacy.  Imagine if an employer tried to 
find out those who attend a certain church.  As a consequence, the individuals who 
attend the church would give up doing so in order not to be fired, at the price of the 
loss of wellbeing due to not taking part in the religious events anymore.  But what 
counts more is that the employer will not gain new information, for those who do 
not participate in the religious services will still maintain the non-competitive 
attitude. The employer will not gain any advantage, while the workers who give up 
the religious ceremony will lose an element of personal wellbeing.  Such inefficiency 
may be handled by protecting, along with the right to privacy, the right to participate 
in religious ceremonies.  
The lack of a cause-effect relationship is also illustrated by another example: Tom 
plays ball every day, and this behavior of his is grounded on a certain “esprit de 
corps.”  The same behavior leads him at work not to disclose the names of less 
productive individuals.  If the employer begins to investigate those who play soccer, 
these persons might quit playing, but that team spirit would not change, so they 
would still be reluctant to identify their less productive co-workers. 
It would be a different matter if there were a cause-effect relationship between the 
two behaviors. Imagine a worker who spends his or her evenings at the bar, drinking 
excessively. The next day, because of the alcohol he or she has in his or her body, the 
worker might not be as productive as he or she might have been, perhaps because of 
inattentiveness while carrying out his or her tasks and operations. In this case, the 
employer's interest might have beneficial effects in terms of welfare: the worker, in 
order to avoid being fired, gives up going to the bar and getting drunk, with a 
beneficial effect on his or her productivity at work. In case the worker still decides to 
continue to go to the bar, he or she will be replaced by a more careful worker. The 
worker loses something (job and salary), but not so much to make him or her give up 
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drinking at the bar, while the employer increases staff productivity.  The net effect 
might well be positive.  
Another  economic justification for protecting privacy can be perceived in the need 
to avoid “over-signaling.” This phenomenon appears when the associated persons 
spend a great deal in the attempt to show their own qualities to a counterpart, but 
to no avail.12  Just consider the hypothesis of workers who, in the attempt to show 
off their attributes, invest in higher education.  Higher education may be seen as 
means of acquiring knowledge, but also as a tool to broadcast one's abilities (those 
who succeed in college present certain attributes).  Now imagine that everyone 
succeeds in their studies.  In this case, earning a diploma or a degree gives no 
information to the employer, while the activity of “signaling” has turned out to be 
expensive for those seeking employment.  One could say that in this case no one 
would have the incentive to tackle a degree program because it would not transmit 
any information. But then, those not earning a degree would be considered 
individuals potentially incapable of earning one, and thus would be discriminated 
against.  In these cases, a restriction on the disclosure of degrees and other 
educational certificates would increase social welfare.  But one must not forget that 
the hypothesis appears rather targeted.  
More clearly, one can maintain that educational level can be determined in a variety 
of degrees, insofar that even lower  levels of education are able to create a 
“separating equilibrium,” that is, to operate as signs.  Individuals are rather led to 
obtain what is required by employers, who move according to a certain bias, and 
                                                            
12  B. Hermalin and P. Aghion “Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency,” 6 J. Law, Econ. 
Organ. 381 (1990). 
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obtain a level of education, possibly excessively high, in order to have the 
“separating equilibrium,” and thereby wasting educational resources.13 
Finally, there is a justification for privacy policies laid out by the authoritative scholar 
Charles Fried14 which, although he himself would probably never define it 
“economic,” still makes references to concepts that might be considered pertinent to 
economics.  Fried writes that15 “it is my thesis that privacy (…) is necessarily related 
to ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and 
trust.  (...) Without privacy, these relationships are simply inconceivable.  They 
require a context of privacy or the possibility of privacy for their existence.”  But 
what exactly is privacy, according to Fried?  He asserts that 16 “as a first 
approximation, privacy seems to be related to secrecy, to limiting the knowledge of 
others about oneself (…)  Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in 
the minds of others, rather it is the control that we have over information about 
ourselves.”  Here the problem arises of understanding Fried's thinking: why should 
privacy, which is the control of information that concerns us personally, be necessary 
to build relationships based on love, friendship and trust? The explanation lies in the 
fact that an individual deepens a relationship with another by conveying secret 
information about himself.  The person in love confides his or her personal business 
                                                            
13 M. Spence, work cited, p. 20. Imagine two classes of workers, the good ones and the distracted ones. By 
requiring a Bachelor's degree, one is able to separate the good from the distracted because the latter are not 
able to earn a degree.  All the same, employers believe that in order to separate the good from the distracted, 
a Master's is required.  In this case, those who are distracted would be even less likely to obtain the degree, 
while the good workers, in sacrificing more, will earn a Master's.  In this hypothesis, there was something 
wasted, since with the Bachelor's degree alone a “separating equilibrium” would have been reached.  
14 C. Fried,  Privacy, 77 Yale L. J. 475 (1968). 
15 C. Fried, work cited, p. 477. 
16 C. Fried, work cited, p. 482. 
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in their boyfriend or girlfriend, who opens up to a friend – these actions simply 
render social relationships more stable, engendering wellbeing for the individuals.  
For this reason, Fried's theory can be considered “economic,” insofar as it aims at 
guaranteeing the building of relationships that increase persons' wellbeing, and help 
boost a community's overall welfare.  One might well note that Fried's theory can 
hardly be reconciled with Posner's.  
4.  The forms of privacy protection  
A first way of privacy protection involves forbidding the interested person to solicit 
information on the individual's characteristics with the intent to promote or to 
discriminate. Thus, one might forbid employers to request HIV-test results, in order 
to avoid that infected individuals be discriminated against.  Posner would hold that 
hiding a fact of that sort would be a fraud like those of salespersons who conceal 
information regarding their products' defects. In any case, if we stipulate that some 
of the aforementioned economic justifications might be valid, one might underline 
that it is desirable for an employer not to request such information. This kind of 
protection is not sufficient to guarantee the privacy of the associates. Here the 
principle of disclosure is also germane. Indeed, how would those individuals who are 
HIV-negative react?  If they are selfish and rational, with no feelings of empathy or 
antipathy towards the other associates, they would unsolicitedly show the test in 
order to be favored over the ill persons.  Those who are not infected by the virus 
would disclose themselves. Left behind would be those who do not intend to declare 
themselves. Here, there begins to be a certain amount of doubt in terms of what 
might be inferred by such practice. The employer might infer that those not 
declaring themselves might be hiding a negative, discrediting information – that of 
being HIV positive. There might also be the possibility that someone might consider 
information on their personal health embarrassing, and would therefore not disclose 
the information for these reasons, even if the test were negative. In any case, it is 
16 
 
privately efficient for the employer to prefer those who disclose themselves since 
among these the probability of the virus being present is zero, while among the 
others it is unknown, and could therefore well be positive (imagine, furthermore, a 
regulation punishing the submission of false information; otherwise all the affected 
individuals would present a fake test showing them to be HIV -negative).  
The same would happen if one were to prohibit the employer from asking for 
potential candidates' G.P.A.s.  Here, too, the principle of complete communication 
would also hold true.  Those who have, in fact, a higher average (4.0, for example), 
would instinctively communicate their G.P.A. to their employer in order not to be 
confused with those with a lower average.  At this point, those who earned a 3.99 
would have the incentive to communicate their G.P.A., since they can no longer be 
mistaken for those with a 4.0, since they have already been revealed, but they only 
risk being lumped in with those having lower G.P.A.s.  To halt this “unraveling” 
mechanism, there must be a law not only to forbid the employer to ask for the result 
earned, but also to keep the prospective employee from unsolicitedly 
communicating their own result.   
An appropriate safeguarding of the privacy calls not only for the interested subject to 
be obliged not to solicit information, but also for the other individual to be required 
not to provide the same information in an unsolicited manner.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
A convincing justification for protecting privacy has, perhaps, not been found.  It is 
possible that individuals might simply have a “taste for privacy,” that is, an innate 
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preference for privacy, developed evolutionarily17 and therefore arguments of a 
economic (consequentialist) nature, would not be able to grasp the needs underlying 
such protection. Theories supporting the view that privacy regulations may support 
the genesis of commercial and social relationships are opposed by the view that 
privacy destroys such relationships because all economic and social exchanges would 
take place with the suspicion that there might be some hidden negative information.  
A clear principle is certainly not easy to ascertain.  Fried's opinions cannot easily be 
reconciled with Posner's.18  The more convincing idea in favor of privacy protection 
would entail a lack of protection: higher expenses to hide oneself from others, 
greater circumspection in how one deals with others and, most of all, forgoing 
behaviors that might reveal an attitude that spawns certain behaviors.  If the person 
who is a political activist in a party characterized by anti-business positions is 
considered pejoratively in his or her workplace, because he or she has  might be 
deemed by the employer  not sharing the goals of the firm, then that person, if it is 
permissible to observe him or her, would give up political activism , but the aptitude 
to be anti-business would not be eliminated, rather it would continue to hold true. In 
this way, the individual who wishes to be a political activist, in effect, lose something 
– the chance to make politics – while the employer would gain nothing because he 
or she would no longer be able to identify persons with such attitudes, and would no 
longer be able to discriminate among employees.  
There remains a not indifferent element having to do with privacy protection: 
privacy favors equality among individuals, hiding them behind a screen that makes 
them more similar amongst themselves.  
                                                            
17 J. Hirshleifer,  Privacy: Its Origin, Function and Future, 9 J. Legal Stud. 649 (1980), pp.651-652. 
18 Fried, in one situation, acknowledged the possibility that Posner's ideas might be valid.  C. Fried, 
Privacy, Economics and Ethics: A comment on Posner, 12 GA L. Rev. 423 (1978), p.423. 
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Whereas the Liberal bourgeoisie of two centuries ago felt the need for privacy in 
order to be left alone (but in Posner's view one would need to say: in order to carry 
out acts that one would not wish to render public because they are discrediting), 
today privacy is perhaps felt more as a tool for not being discriminated against by, or 
better yet distinguished from, other persons.  Anti-discrimination and privacy 
regulations thus see their functions merging.  All of this might have a cost in terms of 
economic efficiency, which might exceed the benefit indicated above regarding the 
possibility of living according to one's own prerogatives.  
In terms of the forms of privacy protection, we have seen how difficult these are to 
handle, given the “unraveling result” or the principle of perfect communication. 
There would need to be an obligation on the part of the interested subject not to 
reveal information, but this result would seem complicated to reach because such 
exchanges of information might well happen in “secret.”  A greater development of 
these legal concepts is needed if one wishes to guarantee an effective safeguarding 
of privacy.  
